To provide unlinkability for wireless sensor network, Jiang et al. proposed 
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks have emerged as a promising computing model for various internet of things applications such as military target tracking and surveillance, natural disaster relief, biomedical health monitoring and hazardous environment sensing. It is usually consisted with a large number of low -cost, battery-powered sensor nodes that are of limited computation and communication capacity [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . While the nodes are left unattended after deployment, they can adaptively form a routing graph and continuously collect data for events of interests and deliver the data to a designated destination. In a hierarchical wireless sensor network, a sensory data is periodically gathered in cluster head and then forwarded to the sink. This method to collect data makes wireless sensor networks very vulnerable to adversary's malicious attacks [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] .
Users generally want to log in to a wireless sensor network via sink node or gateway nodes (GWNs). However, it is not easy to access real time data from the sensor nodes via GWNs only. Thereby, user needs to take direct access to the sensor nodes to acquire data whenever he (or she) requires. Research into security and privacy focused on wireless sensor networks has been challenging issues to researchers [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Wireless sensor networks are subject to various attacks including eavesdropping, modification, interception, replay, tracking and identity exposure because of their open and dynamic nature. Especially, it is great important that only authorized user could access sensor nodes and data from them. Furthermore, their communication between user and sensor node should be secured by using session dependent key.
To solve the above mentioned problem, Das proposed a two factor authentication scheme based on smart card and password [10] . After that, series of security schemes are proposed to improve the scheme [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Recently, Xue et al. proposed a temporal credential based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for wireless sensor networks, which only involves hash and XOR operations [14] . However, Jiang et al. showed that Xue et al.'s scheme is weak against identity guessing attack, tracking
Jiang et al.'s Efficient Two-factor User Authentication Scheme
This section reviews Jiang et al.'s efficient two-factor user authentication scheme with unlinkability for wireless sensor networks [15] . Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme is consisted with three phases: registration phase, login and authentication phase, and password update phase.
Registration Phase
User registers with GWN. A user who wants to become a new legal user U i proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Step The registration phase for SNs is described as follows.
Step 1 : S j submits it's identifier SID j to GWN through a secure channel.
Step 2 : Upon receiving the message, GWN computes TC j =H(K GWN-S ||SID j ), where K GWN-S is the GWN's private key and TC j is the temporal credential for S j . Finally, GWN sends TC j to S j .
Step 3 : After receiving the message, S j stores TC j as its temporal credential.
Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1 : U i inserts his/her smart card to a terminal and enters ID i and PW i . The terminal generates a timestamp TS 4 and randomly chooses a key K i and computes 
Weakness Analysis on Jiang et al.'s User Authentication Scheme
This section provides weakness analyses on Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme. The scheme has bad effect due to the usage of verification table and furthermore, is weak against unsynchronization attack.
Effect on Verification Table
The stolen-verifier attack is infeasible to a scheme when an attacker cannot impersonate the client to the server if the attacker compromises the server and obtains a verifier of a user. Even if Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme could provide infeasibility, it has potential weakness to expose linkability due to (TID i , ID i , TE i ) in the verification table. Thereby, it is recommendable to the security schemes that do not use verification table to check the authenticity of users.
Necessity to Synchronization
Two parties in Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme require to be synchronized with the temporal identity TID i . Otherwise, both of them treat the counterpart as the fake one. However, Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme could easily make it unsynchronized by just changing E GWN with any random bit string of the step 4 message at the login and authentication phase. After GWN replacing TID i with TID i ' in the verification table, U i will reject the session due to the validation failure on E GWN check when U i receives the altered message. Thereby, they are unsynchronized between each other. Thereby, it is recommendable to the security schemes that do not use synchronization mechanism.
Enhanced User Authentication Scheme
This section proposes an enhanced user authentication scheme over wireless sensor networks to solve the weakness problems in Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme. The aim of the proposed scheme is to remove the usage of the verification table in GWN and is not based on the synchronized temporal identity between two parties. The proposed scheme is composed of three phases, registration, login and authentication, and password update.
Registration Phase
Let K GWN-U and PU GWN-U =g K GWN-U denote GWN's private key and its corresponding public key, where s is kept secret by GWN and PU GWN-U is stored inside each user's smart card. When a user, U i wants to be registered to the GWN, U i proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Step 2 : Upon receiving the message, GWN computes TC j =H(K GWN-S ||SID j ), where K GWN-S is the GWN's private key and TC j is the temporal credential for S j . Finally, GWN sends TC j to S j . Step 3 : After receiving the message, S j stores TC j as its temporal credential.
Login and Authentication Phase
When U i wants to access services from the GWN, U i with the smart card proceeds with the following steps Step 3 : Upon receiving the message, S j checks whether the transmission delay is within the allowed time interval T. If T j *-TS 2 > T, where T j * is the current time of S j , S j terminates the current session. Otherwise, S j confirms that the sender of the received message is a legitimate GWN, and computes K i '=PKS GWN H(TC j ||TS 2 ). Then S j generates a timestamp TS 3 and a random key K j and computes 
Password Update Phase
Whenever user wants to change his/her password, he/she could perform this phase without helping of GWN. If a legal user U i wants to change his password, U i enters his password PW i and a new password PW i ', computes PTC i ' = TC i RPW i H(r||PW i '), and replaces PTC i with PTC i '.
Security Analysis
This section provides the security analysis of the proposed scheme focused on stolen verifier attack, unsynchronization attack, password guessing attack, replay attack and user identity guessing attack.
Resilience of Stolen Verifier Attack
Stolen verifier attack means that an attacker steals or modifies the verifiers stored in GWN. In our scheme, GWN does not need to maintain any verifiers in GWN. So, there is no possibility that an attacker could get any useful information for the registered user or modify any information in GWN. Therefore, our scheme is secure against stolen verifier attack.
Resilience of Unsynchronization Attack
Synchronization is necessary to a security scheme that uses any synchronized value between two communication parties. However, the proposed scheme does not need to keep any synchronization value between any parties in the wireless sensor network. Therefore, our scheme is secure against unsynchronization attack.
Resilience of Password Guessing Attack
We could assume that an attacker could get a legal user's smart card and read the memory on it and any intercepted messages on the process of the scheme run. Then only information the attacker could get are { H(·), g, PTC i , PU GWN-U , R } from the memory of
Resilience of User Identity Guessing Attack
Suppose that an attacker could intercept the messages {PU i , DID i , PKS i , TS 1 , C i }, {TS 2 , DID i , C GWN , PKS GWN }, {SID j , TS 3 , C j , PKS j }, and {SID j , TS 4 , PKS j , D GWN , E GWN } from the previous sessions. Then the attacker tries to get certain parameters from these messages, but these messages are treated to be random strings due to the randomness of K i and K j , and the uniqueness of TS 1 , TS 2 , TS 3 , and TS 4 . Therefore, in case of the attacker does not know about these K i and K j , the attacker will face to solve the discrete logarithm problem to get the correct identity from DID i . Hence, the proposed scheme can resist from the user identity guessing attack.
Conclusion
This paper has shown the weakness analyses on a recent user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks proposed by Jiang et al. focused on effect on verification table and unsynchronization possibility. Furthermore, we proposed an enhanced user authentication scheme to solve the weaknesses in Jiang et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme does not use verification table and synchronized values between communication parties. It provides user anonymity and un-traceability by adopting dynamic identifier depending on each session dependent random number and time stamps. The proposed user authentication scheme could be used as a security building block for the wireless sensor network security.
